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Work Item Reference | ETSI Doc. Number |
STF | Technical Body in Charge |
Standard Not Ready For Download |
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| RTS/LI-00265-1 | TS 103 221-1 | LI | |||||
| Current Status (Click to View Full Schedule) |
Latest Version |
Cover Date | Standstill | Creation Date | |||
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2024-04-02 | View Standstill Information | 2024-06-21 | ||||
| Rapporteur | Technical Officer | Harmonised Standard | |||||
Martin Kissel
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Carmine Rizzo
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No | |||||
| Title |
Lawful Interception (LI); Internal Network Interfaces; Part 1: X1 Internal Network Interface X1 |
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Scope and Field of Application |
The internal network interface covers wide area connections between LI systems and (depending on the network) lots of network elements from different vendors. Nearly every network element has its own interface with different transport protocols, authentication (if any), encryption (if any), commands etc. This makes every new connection highly complicated and costly. The interfaces between Administration and Mediation Functions are usually proprietary and internally within a product for LI and therefore need not be compatible between products of different vendors. Traditionally X1 and HI1 interfaces have not been standardized. Given the experience of standardization in HI2 and HI3 industry has received benefits from this by way of interoperability, security and cost reduction. This WI does not intend to force compatibility on legacy equipment although should that be possible it will be welcomed. An inability by the LEMF to support this proposed standard should not allow a fall back to a less secure protocol. The initial focus is on newer IP related systems (but not limited to IP). However there is no intention to exclude circuit switch or other elements from using this output. With a view to the future, as network and services become virtualized this WI intends to support newer implementations by ensuring a standard interface is available to the provisioning equipment or service. The ADMF (provisioning system) translates HI1 messages to X1 and vice versa. It is effectively a proxy between the LEA/LEMF and the network operator. This allows insulation for the CSP to manage their network as they see fit without untoward impact on the LEMF, and vice versa. It also allows for enhanced security management. Maintaining this concept is key to this work item. It is intended to start work with the X1 interface and follow with interfaces X3 and X2. Scope 1.Alignment to Dynamic Triggering 2.Usage scenarios a.Start of an interception b.Modification of a running interception c.Stopping an interception d.Retrieval of details of a running interception e.Retrieval of details of all running interceptions f.Error reporting 3.Transport protocol 4.Transport Security / Encryption 5.Authorisation and authentication 6.Communication Protocol (or command line interface?) 7.Nomenclature and data model This revision is to provide: X1 Certificate Binding; Introduction of X1 Context concept. |
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Supporting Organizations |
Telefonica, KPN, VODAFONE, Swisscom, umlaut, Ministere Economie et Finances, EVE CCS, Ericsson, NTAC, Tencastle, ATIS, Softel Systems, BAE Systems, iTrust Ethics, PSC, DT, OTD, Area, Utimaco, PSC, Group 2000, AQSACOM, SS8, Nokia, Dept of Home Affairs | ||||||
